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LABOUR LAW:
DOCTRINE, DOGMA, FICTION AND MYTH *
A. W. R. Carrothers*
It may be well to preface the paper with a statement of the 
meanings with which the words in the title are used.
A legal doctrine is a proposition the rational base of which 
can be identified and examined, and an opinion can be formed 
as to whether the proposition is useful for the purpose for which 
it is intended.
A legal dogma is a proposition that is accepted without regard 
to its rational validity.
A legal fiction is an invention created in circumstances in 
which a doctrine is inadequate to meet the needs of a situation 
but it is concluded that .the doctrine cannot be reworked, princi­
pally because of the restraining force of stare decisis. A fiction is 
invented to bring the situation under doctrine which is considered 
to meet the needs of the situation and gives that doctrine the 
appearance of having a rational base.
A legal myth is a fiction that is accepted without regard to 
its rational validity.
The thrust of this paper is that the reasons behind much 
common law doctrine applied to picketing and boycotting have 
vanished, as a consequence of which doctrine has been reduced 
to dogma; where dogma has not conveniently fitted the problem, 
fictions have been invented to make solutions appear to fit the 
rules; and that reasons justifying the fictions have been lost, leaving 
a bewildering dross of legal myth.
From the point of view of employees, an effective system 
of collective bargaining requires that they be free to engage in 
three kinds of activity: to form themselves into associations, to
* A paper delivered as part of a series of lectures arranged by the 
Faculty of Law of the University of New Brunswick at the Mid- 
Winter Meeting of the New Brunswick section of the Canadian Bar 
Association, held at Moncton, N .B ., February 13-15, 1964.
t  A. W. R. Carrothers, B.A. (U .B .C .), LL.B. (U .B .C .), LL.M. 
(Harvard), of the Faculty of Law of the University of British 
Columbia, Dean-elect of the Faculty of Law of the University of 
Western Ontario.
1
2 V.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL
engage employers in bargaining with the associations, and to 
invoke meaningful economic sanctions in support of the bargain­
ing.
Association and negotiation are the twin footings on which 
the structure of collective bargaining is raised. The object of 
employee combination is to control the supply of, and hence 
the market for labour, with a view to obtaining more favourable 
terms and conditions of employment. The laws of supply and 
demand respecting the exchange of labour services do not work 
with the speed or objectivity that they do, for instance, in the 
areas of securities and exchange and the money market. Nego­
tiation is the procedure by which competing economic forces 
communicate and arrive at a nexus of settlement.
But negotiation is a sluggish machine. It depends on a wide 
range of human elements— of needs, wants and weaknesses—  
that cannot be entered as a quantified factor into a bargaining 
equation. Behind negotiation, therefore, are sanctions: the 
employer’s sanction to refuse to employ—the lockout; and the 
employees’ sanction to refuse to work— the strike. The employees’ 
refusal to work is an empty sanction if the employer is able to 
replace the strikers and to continue to produce and market as 
before: the whole object of controlling the supply of labour is 
lost. Combinations of employees, therefore, support the sanction 
of a strike by seeking to halt production and to cut off markets. 
The process is the picket, which in its essential nature is an act 
of persuasion. The object is the boycott, which may have, basically, 
three goals: to persuade persons not to go to work for the 
employer; to persuade persons not to supply goods used in the 
employer’s production; and to persuade persons not to handle, 
consume or otherwise deal in the product of the employer.
Some or all of the three activities of uniting into labour 
associations, of engaging the employer in negotiation with the 
union, and of invoking economic sanctions, may appear to be 
obvious concomitants of collective bargaining. But as a matter 
of historical fact at one time all three were illegal, for the interests 
of employees in combination contend with other interests.
The first and most obvious interest in conflict with employee 
freedom of collective bargaining is freedom of entrepreneurial 
action, curbed by the very process of bargaining, yet involving 
the foundations of free enterprise and private ownership of 
property on which is built a justification for collective bargaining 
itself. Second is freedom of choice and action of the individual 
employee, whose individualism may be subordinated to or at
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variance with the collective will of the group. Third is the interest 
of strangers to the collective bargaining relationship, who by their 
contiguity to the conflict may be prejudiced both by the use of 
economic sanctions and by the terms of the collective agreement. 
Fourth is the public interest, which at once claims as part of itself 
the policy of collective bargaining, yet may stand to lose by its 
methods and its results.
Current collective bargaining legislation in Canada secures to 
employees, subject to standards imposed by the statutes, the right 
to combine into trade unions, the right to engage the employer 
in negotiation of a collective agreement, and the right to strike. 
But the right to support the sanction of the strike with picketing 
and boycotting, and to support the picketing and boycotting with 
further sanctions, is at the mercy of a common law of unknown 
content and a few more or less piecemeal statutes whose scope 
remains to be tested in litigation. This area of labour law has 
since the end of World War II given rise to well over one hundred 
reported cases and an untold number of writs. The product is 
a marvel of confusion that would not be tolerated in any other 
area of the law.
Justice according to law is a stratagem through which man 
may pursue a higher justice in human affairs. Certainty is an 
element of legal justice. It behooves us, therefore, as responsible 
lawyers, to consider the state of confusion in this area of the law 
and to contemplate how that confusion might be resolved.
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Privy 
Council are remarkably lacking in direction. In Perrault's case1 the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada turns on the reform 
legislation of the 1870’s, much of which is of highly doubtful con­
stitutional validity. Inasmuch as the Privy Council in the Metallic 
Roofing case2 ordered a new trial we do not know how the courts 
would have applied the law to the facts, for we do not know what 
the facts were. The United Mine Workers' case,3 holding that the 
threat of a strike to gain dismissal of non-unionists is illegal, is 
inconsistent in principle with Newell v. Barker and Bruce.4 The 
judgment in Reners v. The King' was influenced in part by the 
deletion of the saving clause in what is now section 366(2) of 
the Criminal Code. Inasmuch as the clause has been returned
1 Perrault v. Gauthier (1898), 28 S.C.R. 241.
2 Metallic Roofing Co. v. Jose et al., [1908] A.C. 514.
3 United Mine Workers of America v. Williams & Rees (1919), 
59 S.C.R. 240.
4 [1948] 4 D.L.R. 64.
5 [1926] S.C.R. 499.
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to the statute the value of the case as precedent is severely 
attenuated. One of the least durable decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada is the Aristocratic case.6 The finding that might 
have stayed alive was the conclusion that picketing after a concilia­
tion board had reported but before a strike vote was taken was 
lawful. But apart from Todd v. Tomson,1 the cases have con­
sistently denied the right to invoke the economic sanction of the 
picket prior to the exhaustion of the machinery of state regula­
tion contained in the collective bargaining statutes. The Poje case8 
is concerned with the remedial law of contempt of court, not 
with the substantive law of picketing and boycotting. In the 
Patchett case9 the Supreme Court of Canada was concerned 
primarily with liability of the defendant company under railway 
legislation, assuming incidentally that because the union whose 
picketing caused the interruption in service had no labour dispute 
with the plaintiff the picketing was illegal. In the Therien case10 
the court could not consider the law of picketing as such, for the 
defendant union did not engage in that line of conduct. Finally, 
in Gagnon’s case11 the court determined that picketing in support 
of an unlawful strike is ipso facto illegal. It is an important case 
inasmuch as it settles a controversial point of law. But with 
respect, it was a reasonably foreseeable qualification to the Aris­
tocratic decision.12
The principal causes of uncertainty in this area of the law 
seem to be inconsistency in the perception, or absence of percep­
tion, of the nature of the legitimate interests in conflict, and the 
failure of the common law to accept or discharge responsibility 
for developing an appropriate and durable concept of tort law 
for the resolution of the conflicts. At one extreme the common 
law tries to pour the comparatively new wine of industrial con­
flict into such old bottles as the law of defamation, nuisance and 
inducing breach of contract; and at the other extreme it has 
invented and continues to use comparatively new and difficult con­
tainers such as the tort of conspiracy to injure and unjustified 
interference with freedom to trade. The result is a resort to 
doctrine in lieu of reasoning from first principles. The reason 
behind the doctrine becomes lost, whereupon the doctrine becomes 
dogma, learned for its own sake and applied with little regard
6 Aristocratic Restaurants v. Williams et al., [1951] S.C.R. 762.
7 (1957) CCH Canadian Labour Law Reporter, para. 15,125 (B.C.S.C.).
8 Poje v. A.-G. B.C., [1953] S.C.R. 516.
9 Patchett & Sons Ltd.. v. P.G.E. (1959), 17 D.L.R. (2d) 449.
10 Therien v. l.B.T. (1960), 22 D.L.R. (2d) 1.
11 Gagnon v. Foundation Maritime Co. (1961), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 174.
12 Aristocratic Restaurants v. Williams et al., [1951] S.C.R. 762.
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for its ineptitude. To fit dogma to new situations resort is made 
to fictions which add nothing but confusion to an already irrational 
body of law. Even the point of the fictions becomes lost, at which 
stage we are left with the enormity of legal myths.
Defective perception of the nature of industrial conflict and 
bias against both collective action and the institutions of collective 
action are not difficult to document. To begin with, the Supreme 
Court of Canada once asserted, in the United Mine Workers' 
case,13 that striking as such may be illegal at common law. Other 
cases assert that there is no such thing as peaceful picketing— it 
is cleverly dismissed as a contradiction in terms.14
It is hard enough on the law to be misshapen by appre­
hension of the nature of industrial conflict and bias against col­
lective action. But when there is added blind adherence to pre­
cedent, logical fallacy and the invocation of meaningless fiction, 
the law which Lord Mansfield perceived as being in a perpetual 
state of working itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of 
justice15 seems from time to time to degenerate into a witch’s 
brew— what a member of the Supreme Court of Canada robustly 
described in Perrault’s case16 as “the glorious uncertainty of the 
law”— a law which unions are admonished they have an “imper­
ious duty”17 to obey. As an instance of blind adherence to pre­
cedent, in the Rossland Miners’ case,18 the court copied the action 
of the trial court in the Taff Vale case10 in granting an injunction 
against the union itself and in following the precise language of 
the Taff Vale injunction, in spite of the fact that the statute law on 
which the Taff Vale action was founded did not prevail in this 
country. Again, in Sellors v. Woodruff20 the court concluded 
that because the objects of the society were declared illegal by an 
English court in Russell’s case21 the Canadian branch should be 
so treated by a Canadian court. On the important issue of 
whether section 366 of the Criminal Code declares the enumerated 
acts to be wrongful and without lawful authority, as was held in
13 United Mine Workers of America v. Williams & Rees (1919),
59 S.C.R. 240.
14 E.g., Hollywood Theatres v. Tenney, [1940] 1 D.L.R. 452 (B.C.C.A.).
15 Arguendo in Omychund v. Barker (1744), Atk. 21; 26 E.R. 15.
16 Perrault v. Gauthier (1898), 28 S.C.R. 241.
17 International Ladies? Garment Workers Union v. Rother (1922),
41 C.C.C. 70; [1923] 3 D.L.R. 768; affirming 60 Que. S.C. 105 (C .A .), 
per Rivard, J.
18 Le Roi Mining Co. v. Rossland Miners? Union (1901), 8 B.C.R. 370.
19 Taff-Vale Ry v. A.S.R.S., [1901] A.C. 426.
20 [1925] 4 D.L.R. 646 (Ont. C .A .).
21 Russell v. A.S.C.J., [1910] 1 K.B. 586.
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the Lyons case,23 or whether there is a burden of proving not 
only the conduct but the wrongfulness of the conduct, as was 
held in the Ward Lock case,2* two courts24 deprecated the latter 
case in favour of the former, thus concluding that the lesser bur­
den prevails, on the ground that the latter case was reported only 
in the Times Law Reports, even though it was a later decision 
of the same court.
Logical fallacy and the misuse of fiction, often flowing from 
semantic inconsistency, are most clearly illustrated in the cases 
concerning the law of nuisance and cases requiring inference 
regarding intent in the application principally of the law of civil 
conspiracy and inducing breach of contract. In this area the law 
stands challenged by obstructions to answering two disarmingly 
simple questions: “What did the defendants do, and why did they 
do it?” The curse of the law has been its obsessive concern over 
intent.
The tort of nuisance relates to interference, physical or 
otherwise, with rights respecting or usage of land. In some cases 
nuisance is said to be present in watching and besetting, in others 
watching and besetting is said to be a form of nuisance.25 How­
ever the equation may be expressed, since neither factor bears 
precise legal definition, the equation throws little light on the 
meaning of either term. In other cases the court seemed to reason 
that because the picketing is an irritation or an annoyance or a 
nuisance in a colloquial sense, the picketing must be a nuisance 
in a legal sense.28 But peaceful picketing doubtless is a nuisance, 
in a colloquial sense, relating to the enjoyment of property—  
that is what it is calculated to be— and equally doubtless it is not 
unlawful per se. The outer limits of the law of nuisance seem 
to have been reached in the Nipissing Hotel case,27 where picket­
ing was held to constitute a nuisance not because of the form it 
took (in spite of the fact that the decision purports to follow
22 Lyons & Sons Ltd. v. Wilkins et al., [1899] 1 Ch. 255.
23 Ward Lock & Co. v. O.P.A.S.C. (1906), 22 T.L.R. 327.
24 R. v. Reners, [1926] 2 D.L.R. 236 at p. 238, per Harvey, C.J.A.; 
Aristocratic Restaurants v. Williams, [1951] 1 D.L.R. 360 at p. 383, 
per Smith, J. A.
25 E.g., R. v. Elford, (1947), 87 C.C.C. 372 (Ont. Magistrate’s Court); 
Reners v. The King, [1926] S.C.R. 499.
26 E.g., this seems to be the meaning with which the word is used in 
Edland Construction (1960) Ltd. v. Childs & Sallafranque (1963),
39 D.L.R. (2d) 536 at p. 539.
27 Nipissing Hotel v. Hotel Employees’ Union (1963), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 
675; CCH Canadian Labour Law Reporter, para. 15,457.
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Lyons v. Wilkins)-* but because the union was found to have 
acted in bad faith in picketing before the conciliation machinery 
of the Ontario Labour Relations Act had been invoked. The deci­
sion makes intent an integral facet of the law of nuisance.
The element of intent attains its highest order in the law of 
conspiracy to injure, which propounds the doctrine that “a com­
bination of two or more persons wilfully to injure a man in his 
trade is unlawful, and if it results in damage to him, is 
actionable.”-0 The rationale of the doctrine is far from clear. The 
doctrine itself has been repealed in the United Kingdom30 where 
there is a trade dispute, and, in part at least, in four common law 
provinces: British Columbia,31 Newfoundland,,a Ontario^ and 
Saskatchewan.14 But it has had an active career in Canadian 
labour cases, and holds promise of continuing longevity.
The doctrine arose in Quinn v. Leathern33 in which the House 
of Lords upheld a jury verdict against unionists who engaged in 
secondary action to force an employer to dismiss his employees, 
who were denied membership in the union, and to hire members 
of the union in their place. The doctrine was tempered in Sorrell v. 
Smith30 by the recognition of the legitimacy of pursuing self-interest. 
It was refined in the Crofter case^7 by the recognition that a court 
may be required to select from a number of proven objects the 
predominant purpose of the defendants. That case propounds 
the proposition that justification for causing harm is to be found 
in the fact that the predominant object is the pursuit of self- 
interest, and that the court is not concerned with the reasonable­
ness of the pursuit once it is found that self-interest is in fact the 
goal. The judgments try to make these points as clear as possible. 
But the doctrine requires such a subjective assessment of an essen­
tially unprovable— indeed fictional—fact as to give little assurance 
as to how the doctrine may be applied in specific cases.
28 Lyons & Sons Ltd. v. Wilkins et al., [1899] 1 Ch. 255.
29 Headnote to Sorrell v. Smith, [1925] A.C. 700.
30 Trade Disputes Act (1906), 6 Edw. 7, c. 47.
31 Trade-unions Act, R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 384, s. 5.
32 Trade Union Act (1960), c. 5, s. 4.
33 The Rights of Labour Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 354, s. 3 (1 ).
34 Trade Union Act, R.S.S., 1953, c. 259, s. 22 (Am. 1954, 1955, 1956, 
1958, 1961).
35 [19011 A.C. 495.
36 [1925] A.C. 700.
37 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch et al., [1942] 
A.C. 435.
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Latent deviations may be found in the statements in the 
judgments relating to the question of determining the object, par­
ticularly where there may be a multiplicity of objects. In Sorrell’s 
case18 the House of Lords rejected the standard of reasonableness 
in favour of the test of self-interest. But the weakness of the 
proposition is in the process of arriving at a conclusion as to what 
the object is. Were the issue to be left in fact to a jury, the verdict 
is very likely to reflect, not a rational application of the doctrine 
of civil conspiracy as stated in the Crofter case,39 but a collectivc 
hunch of a group of men as to what is right, what is reasonable. 
The “object” of the union in Quinn’s case40 was to gain employ­
ment for its members. That fact is not altered by the existence, for 
whatever reason, of an animus against non-members in the trade. 
The jury doubtless thought it unreasonable that the unionists 
should gain their ends at the expense of persons already employed, 
and by putting economic pressure on innocent strangers. But 
the doctrine of civil conspiracy twists that rationale into a motiva­
tion to punish. It is a thesis of this paper that the application 
of the standard of reasonableness is inherent and inevitable in 
the application of the doctrine of civil conspiracy, and that it 
should therefore be recognized and consciously developed into 
a common law jurisprudence of picketing and boycotting.
The second feature of the doctrine is the necessity for making 
a subjective assessment of a non-existent fact: the predominant 
object of the group. The group as such has no object: the mem­
bers do, and no two predominant objects may be the same. 
Further, in the course of a labour dispute objects may appear 
to change, as the object of any human being may change over a 
long or short period of time. Again, no matter how carefully one 
might endeavour to distinguish object from result, their affinity 
makes the distinction difficult to maintain.
But assuming the distinction between object and result is 
to be maintained, there lies the further question, is there in law 
any extrinsic test by which the object of the conspirators may be 
determined? In the law of contract where intention is to be 
determined the courts are concerned with the outward indications 
of consent. In other fields where the mental state of the wrong­
doer is significant, it may be asked: did he know, or ought he to 
have known? No such guide seems to exist in the law of civil 
conspiracy.
38 Sorrell v. Smith, [1925] A.C. 700.
39 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch et al., [1942] 
A.C. 435.
40 Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A.C. 495.
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As was stated earlier, it is submitted that the standard of 
reasonableness is inherent in the practical application of the 
doctrine of conspiracy to injure, at the first stage of determining 
as a matter of fact the nature of the object or objects of the 
combination and at the second stage where necessary of deter­
mining the nature of the predominant object. It is also submitted 
that the standard is inherent in the test of justification which pro­
vides absolution for the torts of inducing breach of contract and 
interfering with favourable trade relations. It may also very well 
enter into the administration of the law of nuisance. It is further 
submitted that a constant in the judicial apprehension of what 
is reasonable is an assessment, generally unarticulated and per­
haps on occasion unconscious, of the reasonable limits to the 
pursuit of self-interest where two or more interests conflict. This, 
it is submitted, is at the basis of the true nature of the jurispru­
dence of picketing to which judicial reasoning must turn if the 
doctrine of stare decisis is to be spared emasculation by fiction 
and non sequitur. In other words, judges make a choice between 
competing interests in the circumstances before them. When the 
choice is expressed in the language of civil conspiracy the true 
rationale of the choice rarely comes through.
The thesis may be illustrated through the situation of second­
ary picketing. The objects of the union are set out in series.
In the typical instance of secondary picketing the union 
locates persons called pickets at or near the entrances to the 
suppliers’ (or customer’s) premises, who carry signs bearing 
appropriate words, ( 1 ) in order to communicate information; 
(2) in order to persuade persons not to do business with the 
supplier (or customer); (3) in order to produce a boycott of the 
supplier (or customer); (4) in order to threaten the supplier 
(or customer) with economic loss; (5) in order to induce the 
supplier (or customer) not to do business with the employer 
with whom the union has a labour dispute; (6) in order to pro­
duce a boycott against the employer; (7) in order to threaten 
the employer with economic loss; (8) in order to induce the 
employer to agree to the terms of employment proposed by the 
union as being preferable to the threatened (or actual) economic 
loss; (9) in order to improve the welfare and interests of its 
members.
It is no less arbitrary for courts to categorize the picketing 
as a conspiracy to injure on the basis of the object of threaten­
ing the supplier (or customer) with (or actually causing him) 
economic loss on the basis of the object listed fourth in the above
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series than it is for unions to categorize their conduct as consti­
tuting an “information” line on the basis of the first object. The 
ultimate and predominant object is the last, and this fact is not 
altered by temporary or incidental aberrations from lawful con­
duct by union officials or other union agents in pursuing objects 
precedent to the last. Such aberrations should be dealt with on 
their merits (or demerits) and not on the basis of conspiracy to 
injure, as propounded in Quinn v. Leathern,*1 which according 
to the Crofter case42 requires the conclusion that the predominant 
object of the combination (i.e., the union) is to cause unjustified 
injury to the innocent supplier (or customer).
But all this is reflecting conceptual and doctrinal problems— 
it does not go to the fundamental issue of policy.
The real issue is whether at our present stage of social and 
economic development it can be said that the union has a legiti­
mate interest vis-a-vis the person injured by the picketing. If 
the answer is “Yes” the picketing should be permitted unless it 
is being conducted in an unlawful manner. If the answer is “No” 
the picketing should be regarded as illegal irrespective of the fact 
that it is lawful in form and that the union has the ultimate or 
predominant or consistent object of advancing the interests of its 
members. This may be the conclusion reached by the courts 
either inarticulately or articulated in such deceptively cryptic pas­
sages as:
The union had no dispute with the employer and had no earthly
reason to picket it.
The Canadian cases on civil conspiracy show, with certain 
exceptions, distinct attitudes to the use of economic pressure 
through combination. Where the combination is an employers’ 
association directing the sanction against a person in the same 
class of economic interest, the Mogul case43 is followed to the 
conclusion that the combination is not unlawful.44 Where the 
combination is an employers’ association taking action against 
workmen, the combination is not regarded as unlawful.45 Where 
the combination is a union refusing to work alongside non- 
unionists, there is now an attitude that the members are engaged
41 Ibid.
42 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch et at., [1942]
A.C. 435.
43 Mogul Steamships Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow A Co., [1892] A.C. 25.
44 E.g., Gibbins v. Metcalfe (1905), 1 W.L.R. 139; affirming 23 C.L.T.
308.
45 Mitchell v. Woods (1906), 4 W.L.R. 371; Lefebre v. Knott (1907),
13 C.C.C. 223.
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in the legitimate pursuit of self-interest.48 Where, however, the 
pressure is directed against a specific individual away from the 
place of employment, the combination is regarded as a conspiracy 
to injure. Where the combination is a union engaged in a labour 
dispute with an employer, the action of the combination is 
regarded as legitimate so long as the union restricts the direct 
impact of its sanctions to the employer. If, however, it seeks to 
put pressure on the employer indirectly by^taking “secondary 
action” against a supplier or customer of the employer or anyone 
else with whom the union has no direct dispute, the combination 
is regarded as a conspiracy to injure.47
In reaching these conclusions the courts sometimes miscon­
ceive the legal doctrine itself, sometimes infer that the object of 
the combination was to injure from the fact that the picketing 
was being carried out in an unlawful manner or from a perceived 
unfairness in the harm caused to innocent strangers to the dispute. 
Only in rare and recent cases have the courts attempted to state 
their conclusions in terms of their assessment of the merits of 
the claims of competing interests to the protection of the law.
Two cases will illustrate misconception of doctrine. In the 
Metallic Roofing case48 the Privy Council ordered a new trial 
because the jury was misdirected on the law. And a passage in 
Comstock Midwestern v. Scott49 seems in part to propound the 
strange proposition that if the union conveys information to people 
who already possess it, the object must be to injure.
A number of cases infer from the commission of unlawful 
acts that the object of the combination was to injure. The acts 
include violence and general disorder,50 intimidation,51 trespass,5*
46 E.g., Graham v. Bricklayers’ & Masons' Union (1908), 8 W.L.R. 475; 
reversed, 9 W.L.R. 475; Thompson v. Ryall & Cunningham, [1924] 
4 D.L.R. 778; N ewell v. Barker and Bruce, [1950] S.C.R. 385; 
[1950] 2 D.L.R. 289; affirming [1949] O.R. 85; [1949] 1 D.L.R. 544, 
which affirmed [1948] O.W.N. 625, [1948] 4 D.L.R. 64. But cf. Allied 
Amusements v. Reaney, [1937] 4 D.L.R. 162; Johnston et al. v. 
Mackey et al., [1937] 1 D.L.R. 443.
47 E.g., Dusessoy’s Supermarket v. Retail Clerks' Union (1961), 
30 D.L.R. (2d) 51.
48 Metallic Roofing Co. v. Jose et al., [1908] A.C. 514.
49 Comstock Midwestern Ltd. v. Scott et al., [1953] 4 D.L.R. 316 
(B.C.S.C.).
50 Hurtig et al. v. Reiss et al., [1937] 3 D.L.R. 426.
51 Seaboard Owners v. Cross, [1949] 3 D.L.R. 709.
52 Ibid.
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nuisance,53 defamation,54 breach of contract55 and inducing breach 
of contract.50
The consideration of competing interests became obvious in 
Dusessoy’s case,57 where the court enjoined secondary picketing 
on the ground, among other things, that freedom of trade is a 
proprietary right that can be curtailed only in the general interest 
and not for a limited group, and prevails unless the Legislature 
takes it away. The proposition became clear ratio in Hersees' 
case.58 These two cases mark the beginning of a restatement of 
the precepts on which the common law in this field is or should 
be founded. The cases are perhaps more important for the 
approach which they state than for the substantive law which they 
propound. They are only a beginning, and are subject to three 
important qualifications.
First, the cases describe the right or freedom to trade as a 
proprietary right, one which is for the benefit of the community 
at large, and subject to curtailment only in the general interest. 
The union’s right or freedom to picket, in contrast, is described 
as being for the benefit of a limited group or a particular class. 
But collective bargaining has been part of the public policy of this 
country since the reign of Queen Victoria. Both the criminal law 
and the common and civil law have recognized the legitimacy of 
the use of economic sanctions as an integral part of the process 
of collective bargaining. Furthermore, the law of restraint of 
trade, apart from combines legislation, seems to turn largely on 
who is being hurt and by whom. Restraint within the enterprise 
class of interest seems perfectly all right: witness the Mogul 
case.59 Employer combinations against employees— effecting on 
occasion a form of secondary boycott against employees through 
the use of the black list— are acceptable.00 Agreements involving 
commercial restraints generally are upheld. In contrast, employee 
restraints are regarded with a much more sceptical judicial eye.01 
And restraints by organized labour against the enterprise class of 
interest are regarded with less favour still.02
53 Dusessoy’s Supermarket v. Retail Clerks’ Union (1961), 30 D.L.R. 
(2d) 51; CCH Canadian Law Reporter, para. 15,359.
54 Besler v. Matthews, [1939] 1 D.L.R. 499.
55 H ollywood Theatres v. Tenney, [1940] 1 D.L.R. 452.
56 Seaboard Owners v. Cross, [1949] 3 D.L.R. 709.
57 Dusessoy’s Supermarket v. Retail Clerks’ Union (1961), 30 D.L.R. 
(2d) 51.
58 Hersees Ltd. v. Goldstein (1963), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 616.
59 Mogul Steamships Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1892] A.C. 25.
60 Schrader v. Lillis (1885), 10 O.R. 358; Mitchell v. Woods (1906),
4 W.L.R. 371; Lefebre v. Knott (1907), 13 C.C.C. 223.
61 E.g., Gordon v. Ferguson (1961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 420.
62 Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A.C. 495.
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Second, the two cases recognize the interest of the party 
being picketed, identifying his interest with the public interest; 
they recognize incidentally the interest of the employer engaged 
in a dispute whose “rights” are not contended in the litigation; 
and they recognize the interest of the union, the scope of which 
is regarded as being limited to the group. They do not give 
consideration to collective bargaining or the exercise of freedom of 
speech as part of the public interest. And they do not consider 
— they did not have to consider—the interests of other individuals, 
the sum of whose selfish interests contribute to the “public 
interest”, such as employees and customers of the picketed 
person, who also stand to lose by the picketing.
Third, there is a general assumption in the two cases that 
secondary picketing is a clearly delimited circumstance of picket­
ing. Indeed, in Hersees’ case63 the court concludes that the 
Supreme Court of Canada determined in the Patchett case'14 that 
secondary picketing is illegal per se. Antipathy to secondary 
action certainly is the trend in the decisions of this and other 
courts.85 But the generalization takes the decision beyond the 
facts of the case. What the proposition in Hersees' case00 over­
looks is that the circumstances of secondary picketing are not 
constant. For instance, in the Grosvenor Park case07 a union was 
enjoined from picketing adjacent to the employer with whom it 
was in dispute because the employer was located in a shopping 
plaza. Presumably the union in Zeller’s case08 could have been 
enjoined by the lessor. If the union is to have recourse to a
63 Hersees Ltd. v. Goldstein (1963), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 616.
64 Patchett & Sons Ltd. v. P.G.E. (1959), 17 D.L.R. (2d) 449.
65 R. v. Russell (1920), 51 D.L.R. 1; General D ry Batteries v. 
Brigenshaw, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 414; Pacific Western Planing Mills v. 
I.W .A., [1955] 1 D.L.R. 652; Patchett v. P.G.E. (1959), 17 D.L.R. 
(2d) 449; Midland Superior Express Ltd. v. Gen. Truck Drivers’ and 
Helpers’ Union, Local 31 (1956), 19 W.W.R. 618 (B.C.); Verdun 
Printing v. Clicheurs; Sauvé Frères v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
of America, [1959] Que. S.C. 341; Pacific Coast Terminals Co. 
v. International Longshoremen's Etc. Union, Local 502 (1959), 29 
W.W.R. 410 (B.C.C.A.); Noé Bourassa Ltée v. United Packinghouse 
Workers, [1961] Que. S.C. 604; Dusessoy’s Supermarket v. Retail 
Clerks’ Union (1961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 51; Coles Bakery v. Bakery 
etc. Workers’ Union Local No. 468 and B. C. Fed. of Labour (1962), 
36 D.L.R. (2d) 772 (B.C.S.C.); White Lunch Limited and Svend 
Nielsen et al. (1962), CCH Canadian Labour Law Reporter, para. 
15,453; Evans, Coleman <& Evans Limited v. Schone et al. (1963), 
CCH Canadian Labour Law Reporter, para. 15,472.
66 Hersees Ltd. v. Goldstein (1963), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 616.
67 Grosvenor Park Ltd. v. Cave et al. (1963), 40 D.L.R. (2d) 1006.
68 Zeller’s (Western) Ltd. v. Retail Food Union (1962), 40 W.W.R. 435.
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meaningful economic sanction— a precept of effective collective 
bargaining—it must pursue a course of secondary action. Again, 
it is arguable that in cases such as Dusessoy’s?0 and Hersees’10 
the customer of the employer party to the dispute is a major 
part of the total economic force of the employer against whom 
the union is “waging the contest”.71 On this ground alone second­
ary picketing may be justified in the name of the public policy 
of collective bargaining, in the same manner as the Supreme 
Court of Canada permitted the union in the Aristocratic case72 to 
picket other operations of the same employer. The economic 
pressure entailed in the picketing is directly related to the interest 
of the union and the identity of the opposing economic interest. 
A fortiori if the customer insinuates himself into the dispute to 
give “aid and comfort” to the employer —  for instance if in 
Dusessoy’s case73 Codville had contracted out the delivery service 
after the strike occurred, or, for that matter, if Codville did so 
in anticipation of a strike and to the knowledge of the contracting 
party—the party to the contract has aligned himself with the 
economic strength of the employer. Having voluntarily insinuated 
himself into the conflict he can complain with less justification 
that any picketing against him is secondary action and with much 
less justification that it is per se illegal. Further, in the interests 
of protecting the social policy of collective bargaining, courts may 
be called upon to lift the corporate veil to determine whether it 
conceals a more intimate relationship of superficially independent 
legal personalities.74
Much more remains to be said on the subject of the basis of 
the common law in this field than has emerged from Dusessoy’s™ 
and Hersees’™ cases.
In the law of conspiracy to injure, the harm may be excused 
on a finding that it was justified. Justification appears to be no 
more than the obverse of the proposition that the harm caused to
69 Dusessoy’s Supermarket v. Retail Clerks’ Union (1961), 30 D.L.R. 
(2d) 51.
70 Hersees Ltd. v. Goldstein (1963), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 616.
71 Per Rand, J., in Aristocratic Restaurants v. Williams et al., [1951] 
S.C.R. 762.
72 Ibid.
73 Dusessoy’s Supermarket v. Retail Clerks’ Union (1961), 30 D.L.R. 
(2d) 51.
74 Contra: White Lunch Limited and Svend Nielsen et al., (1962), CCH 
Canadian Labour Law Reporter, para. 15,453.
75 Dusessoy’s Supermarket v. Retail Clerks’ Union (1961), 30 D.L.R. 
(2d) 51.
76 Hersees Ltd. v. Goldstein (1963), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 616.
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others by the pursuit of legitimate self-interest by lawful means 
is not actionable. The legitimacy of the object is said to provide 
justification, or just cause or excuse, for the harm inflicted by 
the combination. Much the same concept of justification seems 
to apply to interference with freedom to trade: if the object is 
legitimate, the harm is justified.
Obstacles to the application of the concept of justification are 
semantic, evidentiary and emotional. What does the word justifi­
cation mean, what kind of evidence is really relevant to a deter­
mination of the object of the combination, and to what extent is 
the court’s disapproval of the consequences of the action of the 
combination a probable or inevitable element in determining 
whether the action of the group is justified? If in the opinion of the 
viewer the object pursued by the combination is less important than 
the interest harmed by the combination, the action of the combina­
tion seems “unjustified”. If the harm caused appears out of propor­
tion to the gain, the conduct of the combination seems unreasonable 
and therefore “unjustified”. If the combination pursues its objects 
in a spirit of antagonism or in an atmosphere of discourtesy it 
appears malicious, and therefore wilful, and therefore unreason­
able, and therefore “unjustified”. If the conduct oo^’.ains acts 
in themselves unlawful, those acts must be taken to be intentional; 
therefore the object appears to be unlawful, and hence “unjusti­
fied”. It is submitted that the concept of justification as stated 
in such cases as Crofter77 and Thomson v. Deakin78 has given 
way to a determination of the lawfulness of picketing according 
to the evaluation of the courts as to whether the interests 
prejudiced by the picketing should prevail over the interests which 
the picketing is calculated to advance, and that this evaluation 
has been confused, disguised and complicated by the invocation 
of the common law relating to civil conspiracy, inducing breach 
of contract and interference with favourable trade relationships, 
by the attribution of motive stemming from the use of question- 
begging adjectives, and from inferences based on tortious elements 
in the manner in which the picketing was being carried out.
Remarkably few cases consider the nature of justification in 
the law of civil conspiracy or seek to identify the kind of interest 
in the protection of which, or circumstance in which, justification 
might rest.
77 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch et al., [1942] 
A.C. 435.
78 Thomson (D. C.) Ltd. v. Deakin et al., [1952] Ch. 646, 666.
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The modern tort of inducing breach of contract is stated by 
Viscount Simon by illustration in the Crofter case:79
If C has an existing contract with A and B is aware of it, and if 
B persuades or induces C to break the contract with resulting 
damage to A, this is, generally speaking, a tortious act for which 
B will be liable to A for the injury he has done him. In some 
cases, however, B may be able to justify his procuring of the 
breach of contract.
In the circumstances of industrial conflict, the application of the 
doctrine depends on the imputation to the defendant of intention 
to cause damage, of knowledge of the contract, of inducement of 
others to commit an unlawful act, and on a determination of 
whether there is justification.
The first imputation involves the same kind of problem as 
determining the object of a combination, and is loaded against 
picketers by the premise that a person must be taken to intend 
the foreseeable consequences of his actions. The second imputa­
tion is made less difficult by reason of the fact that the tortfeasors 
need not know the contents of the contract but only that a con­
tractual relationship exists.80
The third imputation may be effected by judicial notice 
that as a matter of practice union members and sympathizers do 
not cross picket lines,81 even though the refusal to do so may 
result in breach of contract of employment or other services or 
of supply.82 Further, the imputation involves a distinction between 
advocating an end which could be obtained lawfully and advanc­
ing lawful means. The distinction raises the question whether it 
invites the piously fraudulent admonition “Don’t throw him in 
the duck pond”* But whether picketing advocates the means or 
the end is a question not of law but of fact, admittedly difficult, 
which may elicit different answers in different cases. What 
amounts to inducement is not clear.
79 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch et al., [1942] 
A.C. 435, at p. 442.
80 Body v. Murdoch, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 326.
81 Hammer v. Kemmis (1956), 20 W.W.R. 619; 7 D.L.R. (2d) 684; 
affirming 18 W.W.R. 673; 3 D.L.R. (2d) 565; Hersees Ltd. v. 
Goldstein  (1963), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 616; White Lunch Limited and 
Svend Nielsen et al. (1962), CCH Canadian Labour Law Reporter, 
para. 15,453; Re Canadian Air Line Pilots’ Association et al. ex p.
H. L. Bray et al. (1963), 40 D.L.R. (2d) 125; Island Shipping Ltd. v. 
Devine et al. (1963), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 226; Foundation Co. of Canada 
Ltd. v. McGloin et al. (1963), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 209.
82 See Comstock Midwestern Ltd. v. Scott, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 316 (B.C.)
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The issue of justification is as difficult as it is in the doctrine 
of civil conspiracy to injure,83 and just as likely to be resolved 
against the defendants. None of the Canadian cases recognizes 
the pursuit of self-interest as providing justification for inducing 
breach of contract as it does, theoretically, in the civil conspiracy 
cases.
The major exception to the narrow view of justification is 
illustrated by the Becker case.84 The court concluded that a union 
that was locked out could picket a construction project even after 
the subcontractor who had caused the lockout had terminated his 
contract with the master plumber. The decision is of first import­
ance to building trades unions, who have been party to nearly 
thirty per cent of the reported cases of picketing and boycotting 
since World War II, mainly in British Columbia and Ontario. The 
litigation has related largely to picketing for recognition, but also 
has involved negotiation picketing. Were the union’s right to 
picket defeasible by the insinuation of a new subcontractor into 
the relationship, the law of inducing breach of contract would 
take a strange twist. As it is, the Becker case85 seems to support 
the tentative proposition that a person cannot be deprived of 
freedom of action by the creation of contractual relations which 
stand to be prejudiced by the action.
Although the distinction means very little to the cause of the 
satisfactory settlement of industrial disputes, the courts recognize 
the subtle difference between inducing a breach of contract and 
inducing the contracting parties to terminate the contract, for the 
breach, a unilateral act, is actionable, whereas termination, a 
mutual act, is not.80 The settlement of a breach of contract wrong­
fully induced by a person not party to the contract does not of 
itself release the person inducing the breach from a claim against 
him for interference with the contract.
The systems of industrial relations in Canada, as a matter 
of deliberate public policy, are based on collective action, the use 
of market forces, and the concept of countervailing power. The 
burden of this paper is that the familiar torts of nuisance, con­
spiracy and inducing breach of contract have produced, in a suffi­
cient number of cases to warrant serious attention, results that
83 Divers v. Burnett, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 930 at p. 937.
84 Becker Construction Co. v. Plumbers’ Union (1958), 15 D.L.R. (2d) 
354.
85 Ibid.
86 E g., Hay v. Local Union No. 25, Ontario Bricklayers etc. International 
Union, [1929] 2 D.L.R. 336; Klein v. Geneves & V arleyi [1932]
3 D.L.R. 571; Newell v. Barker & Bruce, [1948] 4 D.L.R. 64.
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indicate that the law is out of touch with the realities of those 
systems. The issue to us as lawyers interested in keeping the law 
abreast of social reality is whether the salvation of the law is to 
be found in legislative reform or in a reworking of the common 
law itself.
The advantage of lawmaking by the legislature on this 
subject is that a complex issue of policy should be determined in 
a political forum, as was done in one direction in England by the 
Trade Disputes Act of 190687 and as was done in another direction 
in the United States by the Taft-Hartley Act of 194788 and the 
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.81' The English Act virtually put 
trade unions above the law. The American statutes attempt to 
state in detail the circumstances in which persuasion is prohibited 
and the objects which may not be sought through economic pres­
sure. Although the legislation is the product of the exhaustive 
machinery of Congress, it leaves many questions to be settled by 
litigation.
The British Columbia Trade-Unions Act of 195900 approaches 
the problem of restating the law in a third manner. It declares 
the right of a union to picket at the employer’s place of business, 
operations or employment in support of a lawful strike. It then 
prohibits persuasion otherwise. But the statute does not articulate 
a philosophy relating to the nature and legitimacy of interests that 
come into conflict in industrial relations, nor does it state reasons 
why the conflict should be resolved in a particular way, for the 
opportunity to give such broad direction disappeared when the 
preamble to a statute fell into disuse; the statute also contains its 
own problems of interpretation.
Although a select committee on labour relations of the 
Ontario Legislature in 1958 recommended legislation that would 
have had the effect of outlawing secondary picketing, the legisla­
tion that materialized fell short of that objective. The statute91 
now merely prohibits conduct which is likely to induce an unlaw­
ful strike or an unlawful lockout. Where a union is on strike 
lawfully, it appears that it may engage in secondary action that 
causes an illegal work stoppage. But where the union does not 
carry its dispute to the strike stage that same secondary action is 
prohibited. The contribution of the section to industrial peace 
is difficult to assess.
87 (1906), 6 Edw. 7, c. 47.
88 (1947), c. 120, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 61 Stat. 136.
89 (1959) P.L. 86-259, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 U.S.C., c. 7.
90 R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 384.
91 Rights of Labour Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 384, s. 57.
U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL 19
The Alberta statute0’ also approaches the problems of picket­
ing and boycotting piecemeal. It prohibits organizational and 
recognition picketing, picketing in support of an illegal strike, and 
the technique of declaring goods hot in order to insure that work 
done on goods is performed by unionized labour.
The Newfoundland statute03 now contains a provision the 
same as section 3 of the British Columbia Trade-unions Act of 
1959. However, it also includes a significant saving provision that 
“public expressions of sympathy or support, otherwise than by 
picketing, on the part of trade unions or others not directly con­
cerned in the strike or lockout and persuasion and endeavours to 
persuade by the use of circular, pr^ss, radio or television will not 
be deemed to be a breach” of the statute. This provision would 
appear to meet to a large extent the criticism levelled at the 
British Columbia Trade-unions Act that in putting restraints on 
the device of the picket it incidentally put unwarranted restraints 
on general freedom of speech.
The questions which the present statutes create or leave 
unanswered demonstrate a severe limitation on the legislative 
process as a method of law reform in this area. It is virtually 
impossible to foresee all eventualities of circumstance or all mani­
festations of conflict or persuasive technique. If the interests 
actually or potentially in conflict can be identified they represent 
a wide disparity in strength or weakness, or even of legitimacy, 
at any moment in time or over a span of time. Consequently, any 
general declaration of the law that seeks to have universal applica­
tion and durability, but which possesses a crystalline resistance 
to subtle distinctions and to change, as a statute tends to do, is 
destined to create anomalies, and perhaps imbalance and inequity, 
in the industrial scene. It is one more argument for a revivification 
of the common law.
The advantage of judge-made law over the product of the 
Legislature lies in the very quality of viability in the common 
law which seems so lacking in the picketing cases. The disadvan­
tage, some would say the disqualification, of the common law is 
to be found in another great myth that it is not the proper func­
tion of judges to make or even to explain the law, but only to 
expound it. If the task of restatement of the tort law of picketing 
and boycotting is to be performed by the courts, the role of 
judicial creativeness must be recognized in order that the bases
92 The Alberta Labour Act, R.S.A., 1955, c. 167, ss. 64, 80(4), 95(2)
(as enacted by 1960, c. 54, s. 31).
93 Labour Relations Act, R.S.N., 1952, c. 258, s. 43A (as enacted by
1963, No. 82, s. 4 ).
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of the law may be stated in contemporary terms and the applica­
tion of the law take rational account thereof. It is not too late 
to realign precedent with a recognition of the nature and legiti­
macy of the interests that compete for supremacy in industrial 
conflict. Reform is quite possible within the limits imposed by 
the nature of the judicial process, and without doing violence to 
legal doctrine.04 The element of intent, the standard of reasonable­
ness and the notion of justification—the very ingredients of the 
law which have estranged it from industrial society— offer a 
medium for effecting a rapprochement. They are the tools through 
which judicial creativeness may find expression in the best tradition 
of the common law.
But a conscientious reassessment of the law does not begin 
with the writing of judgments. It starts with the drafting of plead­
ings, the production of evidence, and the presentation of argu­
ment. The Bar itself must accept responsibility for performing 
a creative role. The threshold of the common law must be sought 
at the door of counsel’s chambers.
94 Edland Construction (1960) Ltd. v. Childs & Sallafranque (1963),
39 D.L.R. (2d) 536 at p. 537; Foundation Co. of Canada Ltd. v. 
McGloin et al. (1963), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 209.
